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Abstract Embedded epistemic modals are infelicitous under desire predicates
when they are anchored to the belief state of the attitude holder (see, esp., Anand &
Hacquard 2013). We present two ways of deriving this observation from an inde-
pendently motivated property of desire predicates (Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999).
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1 A puzzle about embedded epistemics
1.1 The generalization
In (1-a), the epistemic modal must is anchored to what John knows, and in (1-b),
to what the police knows.1
(1) a. John believes that Mary, given what he knows, must be the murderer
b. John believes that Mary, given what the police knows, must be the
murderer
We say an epistemic modal embedded under an attitude verb is “subject oriented”
when it is anchored to the belief state of the attitude holder. Now consider (2).
(2) a. #John hopes that Mary, given what he knows, must be the murderer
b. John hopes that Mary, given what the police knows, must be the mur-
derer
When the embedding verb is the desire predicate hope instead of the doxastic pred-
icate believe, the subject oriented reading of the embedded epistemic gives rise to
deviance (cf. Hacquard & Wellwood 2012; Anand & Hacquard 2013). Let us state
the generalization.
* The research has been supported by a Volkswagen Stiftung grant (VWZN3181) and an ERC Ad-
vanced Grant (ERC-2017-ADG 787929, ‘Speech Acts in Grammar and Discourse’).
1 For now, we remain vague about what “anchored” means. Here and in the rest of the paper, all
embedded modals are intended to have the epistemic reading.
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(3) Embedded Epistemics Generalization (EEG)
Subject oriented epistemics are infelicitous under desire predicates.
Note that without adverbials such as given what the police knows, embedded epis-
temics tend to have the subject oriented reading as default, hence the infelicity of
the following sentences.2
(4) a. #John hopes that Mary must be the murderer
b. #John wants Mary to have to be the murderer
c. #John demands that Mary must be the murderer
2 Ignorance
This paper presents a new derivation of the EEG. We start with the semantics of
desire predicates, taking the verb want to be their representative. Heim (1992)
argues for a non-monotonic semantics of want:
(5) Heim’s analysis of wantJwant ϕKi,g(x) = 1 iff
∀i′ ∈ Bix(simi′(Bix ∩ [λ i.JϕKi,g]) <i,x simi′(Bix ∩ [λ i.J¬ϕKi.g]))
In (5), Bix is the set of indices compatible with x’s beliefs at i, simi(X) picks out those
members of X that are “most similar” to i, and X <i,x Y is the condition that every
member of X is more desirable to x at i than any member of Y .3 Thus, Heim’s anal-
ysis of want involves a comparison between the ϕ and the ¬ϕ alternatives within
the attitude holder’s belief, stating, essentially, that for x to want ϕ is for x to believe
that every way of making ϕ true is better than any way of making ¬ϕ true.
In contrast to Heim, von Fintel (1999) argues for a monotonic, Kratzerian se-
mantics of want:
(6) von Fintel’s analysis of wantJwant ϕKi,g(x) = 1 iff maxDix(Bix)⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g]
In (6), Dix is the set of x’s desires at i and maxP(X) picks out those members of X
that are “optimal” with respect to P.4 According to this analysis, for x to want ϕ is
for x to find ϕ true in the most desirable scenarios among those which he considers
possible.
The explanation we are going to provide for the EEG does not require us to
2 Because want does not take a tensed complement, the embedded modal cannot be must.
3 To be explicit, X <i,x Y iff ∀x ∈ X(∀y ∈ Y (x <i,x y)).
4 Specifically, maxP(X) = {i ∈ X | ¬∃i′ ∈ X({p ∈ P | p(i) = 1} ⊂ {p ∈ P | p(i′) = 1})}. Note that Dix,
in the lexical entry in (6), is a set of propositions, not a set of indices.
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choose between (5) and (6). We can therefore remain agnostic with respect to the
differences between the non-monotonic and the monotonic analysis of want as well
as which of the two analyses may be more adequate. However, we will not remain
agnostic with respect to what these analyses have in common. Both (5) and (6)
make crucial reference to an information state, specifically the belief state of the
attitude holder, and both turn out to predict that a want-sentence will be a triviality
in case the subject believes the complement or its negation.5 These predictions
are intuitively false, since it does not seem valid to infer from John believes that
Mary smokes or John believes that Mary doesn’t smoke that John wants Mary
to smoke is true, or is false. In fact, the last sentence is perceived as infelicitous if
either of the first two sentences is true.
To resolve this problem, Heim and von Fintel both add a definedness condition
to the semantics of want, given in (7), which requires that the subject of want not
be opinionated, i.e. be ignorant, about its complement. As desired, this condition
not only guarantees that we cannot infer from John believes that Mary (doesn’t)
smokes to John wants Mary to smoke, but also entails that these sentences are
incompatible (see Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999; Rubinstein 2017 for refinements).
(7) IgnoranceJwant ϕKi,g(x) is defined only if ∃i′ ∈ Bix(JϕKi′,g = 1) ∧ ∃i′ ∈ Bix(JϕKi′,g = 0)
In what follows, we provide two accounts of the EEG, both of which capitalize on
the Ignorance condition and which differ in their assumptions about modal seman-
tics.
3 Resolving the puzzle
In order to appreciate the import of Ignorance for the EEG, we need to make some
assumptions about epistemic modals. We discuss two common approaches to them
and show that, in concert with Ignorance, they allow for a routine explanation of
the EEG.
5 Consider Heim’s analysis. If x believes ϕ , then Bix ∩ [λ i.J¬ϕKi,g] = /0, hence simi′(Bix ∩
[λ i.J¬ϕKi,g]) = /0. Similarly, if x believes ¬ϕ , then simi′(Bix ∩ [λ i.JϕKi,g]) = /0. But given the
definition of <i,x, it is trivially true that X <i,x Y if either X = /0 or Y = /0 (see note 3). Now
consider von Fintel’s analysis. Given that maxDix(B
i
x) ⊆ Bix by definition, if x believes ϕ , then
Bix ⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g], hence maxDix(Bix)⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g], and if x believes ¬ϕ , then Bix ⊆ [λ i.J¬ϕKi,g], hence
maxDix(B
i




We start the standard relational semantics for epistemic modals in (8), where g(R)
is the contextually determined accessibility relation.
(8) Relational semantics of mustJmustR ϕKi,g = 1 iff g(R)(i)⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g]
We assume that the subject oriented reading of embedded epistemics results from
g(R) being set to [λ i.Bix], where x is the subject of the embedding attitude verb.
Now consider (9).
(9) #John demands that Mary must be the murderer
Under the (infelicitous) subject oriented reading, Ignorance imposes on (9) the de-
finedness condition in (10), with i the index of evaluation and ϕ = Mary be the
murderer.
(10) ∃i′ ∈ Bij(JmustR ϕKi′,g = 1) ∧ ∃i′ ∈ Bij(JmustR ϕKi′,g = 0), i.e.
∃i′ ∈ Bij(Bi
′
j ⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g]) ∧ ∃i′ ∈ Bij(Bi′j ̸⊆ [λ i.JϕKi,g])
What (10) says is that John’s belief does not rule out the possibility that he believes
that Mary is the murderer, and does not rule out the possibility that he does not
believe that Mary is the murderer. Thus, (10) says that John is ignorant about his
own belief. Obviously, nothing we have said so far prevents (10) from being true.
Thus, we predict, all things being equal, that (9) should be felicitous, contrary to
observation.
There may be good reasons to believe that not all things are equal, however.
One common hypothesis about epistemic agents is that they are in fact not ignorant
about their own belief: if x believes p then x believes that x believes p, and if x does
not believe p then x believes that x does not believe p (e.g., Hintikka 1962; Lewis
1969; Stalnaker 2002, among others).
(11) Introspection
for all x, p, i, it holds that ∀i′ ∈ Bix(Bi
′
x ⊆ p)∨∀i′ ∈ Bix(Bi
′
x ̸⊆ p)
With this additional hypothesis in hand, we can now explain the deviance of (9): Ig-
norance and Introspection, together, impose contradictory demands on the attitude
holder of (9), since (10) is incompatible with (11) (cf. Crnič 2014). Note, impor-
tantly, that the conflict between Ignorance and Introspection arises only in the case
of subject oriented epistemics under desire predicates: if the embedding verb is a
doxastic predicate, Ignorance does not apply – this accounts for the acceptability of
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(1) –, and if the reading is not subject oriented, Introspection is not problematic –
this accounts for the acceptability of (2-b).
3.2 Domain semantics
Can we derive the deviance of (9) by formulating a different, non-relational, seman-
tics for modals instead of adding Introspection to the theory? It turns out we can.
Suppose we follow Yalcin (2008) and assume a “domain” semantics for modals,
taking the index to be a pair ⟨w,S⟩ with w a possible world and S an information
state which is a set of possible worlds (see Ninan 2018 for discussion).6
(12) Domain semantics for mustJmust ϕK⟨w,S⟩,g = 1 iff S ⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g]
The subject oriented reading of an embedded epistemic modal, in this framework,
will result from S being set to Bwx , with x the subject of the embedding verb and w
the world of evaluation for the attitude ascription. Suppose Ignorance is formulated
as in (13).
(13) Ignorance (domain semantics version)Jwant ϕK⟨w,S⟩,g(x) is defined only if
∃w′ ∈ Bwx (JϕK⟨w′,S⟩,g = 1) ∧ ∃w′ ∈ Bwx (JϕK⟨w′,S⟩,g = 0)
The definedness condition imposed by Ignorance on (9), under the subject oriented
reading, will then be (14), with ϕ = Mary be the murderer and w the world of
evaluation.
(14) ∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Jmust ϕK⟨w′,Bwj ⟩,g = 1) ∧ ∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Jmust ϕK⟨w′,Bwj ⟩,g = 0), i.e.
∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Bwj ⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g]) ∧ ∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Bwj ̸⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g]), i.e.
Bwj ⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g] ∧ Bwj ̸⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g]
Of course, (14) is a contradiction. This means that we can say that the deviance
of (9) is due to its having a non-satisfiable definedness condition. Note, again, that
this situation arises only when the epistemic is embedded under a desire predicate
and has the subject oriented reading. If the embedding verb is a doxastic predicate,
Ignorance does not apply, and if the reading is not subject oriented, the existential
quantification in (14) would not be superfluous. To illustrate the latter scenario,
consider (15).
6 Being true at an index will now mean being true with respect to w, as in the case of non-modalized




(15) John demands that Mary must be the murderer according to the police
The complement of demands in (15), clearly, should be evaluated with respect to
John’s belief about what the police believes. Thus, Ignorance would impose on (15)
the condition in (16), where Bw
′
p is the police’s belief at w
′.
(16) ∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Bw
′
p ⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g]) ∧ ∃w′ ∈ Bwj (Bw′p ̸⊆ [λw.JϕK⟨w,S⟩,g])
The existential quantifications in (16) are not superfluous, hence (16) is not contra-
dictory.
3.3 Distinguishing between the two approaches?
The relational semantics account requires two definedness conditions, namely Ig-
norance and Introspection, while the domain semantics account requires only one,
namely Ignorance. It follows, then, that an observation which requires abandoning
at least one of these conditions will count as evidence in favor of domain semantics.
With that said, consider (17).
(17) John wants to believe that Mary is the murderer
The data we have discussed until now involve epistemics embedded under desires
and doxastic predicates. We have not looked at cases where a doxastic predicate
is embedded under a desire predicate, which is what (17) is. It turns out that to
the extent that (17) is felicitous, it supports the domain semantics account. Igno-
rance imposes on (17) the condition in (18-a), and Introspection imposes on it the
condition in (18-b), with p = ‘that Mary is the murderer.’
(18) a. ¬(John believes (he believes p)) ∧ ¬(John believes ¬(he believes p))
b. (John believes (he believes p)) ∨ (John believes ¬(he believes p))
As (18-a) and (18-b) contradict each other, the felicity of (17), to the extent that it is




Ignorance and Introspection impose the same conditions on must ϕ as they do on
might ψ , where ψ is ¬ϕ . Thus, we expect the observations we have made about
must to hold for its dual might also. This is true to a large extent.
650
Ignorance & Introspection
(19) a. #John hopes that Mary, given what he knows, might be the murderer
b. John hopes that Mary, given what the police knows, might be the
murderer
(20) a. John believes that Mary might be the murderer
b. #John demands that Mary might be the murderer
However, there is a difference between must and might: it seems that in sentences
without adverbials such as given what x knows, the non-subject oriented reading
under hope is more easily obtained with might than with must (cf. Anand & Hac-
quard 2013).
(21) a. #John hopes that Mary must be the murderer
b. John hopes that Mary might be the murderer
We have no solution to this puzzle and will have to leave it to future work.
4.2 Variability with respect to Ignorance
We have formulated Ignorance as a felicity condition which is to be imposed on all
desire predicates. Data show that reality is more fine-grained, and that Ignorance
should likely be lexically constrained, with each verb, in principle, determining the
relevant domain in its own way (cf., e.g., Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999; Scheffler
2008; Anand & Hacquard 2013, among others). Consider the contrast in (22).
(22) a. I know Mary is playing video games but I want her to be swimming
now
b. #I know Mary is playing video games but I hope that she is swimming
now
(23) a. #I want to have been sick
b. I wish to have been sick
Again, we have no solution to this puzzle and will leave it to future work.
4.3 Anand & Hacquard (2013)
In their pioneering work on the EEG, Anand & Hacquard (2013) adopt a preference-
based, Heimian analysis of want, combining it with a domain semantics for modals,
and with the assumption that the complement of want will be evaluated with respect
to a “special” information state, namely /0.7
7 The formulation in (24) renders Anand & Hacquard’s (36), i.e. their proposed semantics for want,
in notation more consistent with that used in this paper, while keeping to the same content.
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(24) Anand and Hacquard’s analysis of wantJwant ϕK⟨w,S⟩,g(x) = 1 iff [λw′.JϕK⟨w′, /0⟩,g]<w,x [λw′.J¬ϕK⟨w′, /0⟩,g]
Coupled with the assumption that Jmust ϕK⟨w,S⟩,g, and Jmight ϕK⟨w,S⟩,g, are unde-
fined if S = /0, this semantics has the consequence that a want sentence is defined
only when the complement of want is such that its evaluation makes no reference
to the information state, i.e. that it is non-modalized.
In contrast to Anand and Hacquard’s account, our proposal is agnostic with re-
spect to the assertive component of desire predicates as well as compatible with the
tight connection between belief and desire argued for in Heim (1992) and von Fintel
(1999). Furthermore, the proposal does not require any special assumptions about
what information states epistemic modals can be relativized to in specific construc-
tions. While there may well be strong reasons for adopting Anand and Hacquard’s
treatment of want and their split between doxastic and desire predicates, the EEG
does not necessarily furnish one.
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